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WEST GERMANY: Neutro	on Weapons		,
Propident Canton's d.	German Chancell ecision to defe	r production (of the neutron
weapon in yesterday! Germany's response t	s Bundestag debe o that decision	ate that focus	sed on West o expressed
trust that the US wo terests while negoti	uld uphold the	West European:	s' security in-
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25X1	//Both the governing and opposition parties agreed, however, that West Germany needs the neutron weapon as a negotiating "chip." In discussing the weapon, Schmidt spoke of "disparities which jeopardize the balance of power in the conventional realm and, to a growing extent, in the nuclear mediumrange field" and said that it is important that the latter disparities be considered during the SALT negotiations.//	
25X1	//The opposition called on the government to convey to President Carter its support for stationing the neutron weapon in NATO countries, including West Germany, but its resolution was defeated.//	
25X1	//Leaders of the opposition parties charged that the government had neglected West German and European security rather than dispute openly the Social Democratic opponents of the neutron weapon, especially former Chancellor Brandt and Egon Bahr, one of the first Social Democrats to criticize the weapon.//	
25X1	//Spokesmen from both the governing and opposition parties accused the other side of damaging relations with the US. Schmidt accused Christian Social Union leader Franz Josef Strauss of slandering President Carter while Strauss charged that Schmidt is a feckless leader and accused Bahr of insulting the President by characterizing the neutron weapon as a "preversion of thought." There was acknowledgment from both sides that relations with the US are not always easy.	25X1
	PORTUGAL: Leadership Struggle	 25X1
25X1	Differences between moderate and conservative factions threaten to rupture Portugal's largest opposition partythe Social Democratsand have already prompted its governing political committee to resign. A showdown is expected this weekend when moderates, led by party head Sousa Franco, confront sympathizers of former party leader Sa Carneiro in a meeting of the party's national council. President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares, both objects of Sa Carneiro's personal vendettas, will face increasing pressures if the party's right wing emerges victorious.	
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the national cou The council will	//The decision on th ncil, which has a so be extremely reluct	mewhat broader ant to accept	party base.// the resigna-
tions and may tr a harder line th	y to persuade the cu at will appease righ	rrent leadersn twingers.	ip to adopt
Tf +b	e resignations are a	ccented the m	atter will do
before the nation is greatest.	nal party congress,	where Sa Carne	iro's support
	ccommodation of the	right seems in	evitable if
the party is to	remain intact. As th dent, Sa Carneiro ma	e party's spir	itual leader
support among th	e Social Democratic g numbers of party m	rank and file.	His views
ernment is selli	ng out to Western fi d Soares of secret d	nancial intere	sts and who
In rec	ent attacks Sa Carne	iro accused Ea	nes of lead-
that Eanes' fail	o "presidential mili ure to act in past g	overnment cris	es makes the
nomic and politi	ares responsible for cal problems. Such c	riticism poses	no immediate
must devote itse	es and Soares, espec lf to internal probl	ems. It does,	however, in-
dicate what can hind Sa Carneiro	be expected if the r	ight wing clos	es ranks be-
INTERNATIONAL: C			
strengthened in	of copper on the Lo recent weeks as a re	sult of increa	sing bullish-
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25X1	Copper prices have risen from 54 cents a pound in early March to 60 cents on Monday. Market optimism has been sparked by the announced agreement between Zambia, Zaire, and Peru to cut production by 15 percent. Zaire also decided in late March to meet sales commitments with purchases from London Metal Exchange copper stocks, which have dropped by 10 percent since mid-January, and thus added further to upward speculative pressures.	
25X1	The impact of these moves will be temporary. Although consumption may reach a record 7 million tons this year, demand will remain well below capacity. Capacity has increased steadily since the previous consumption record of 6.9 million tons in 1973.	
25X1	Prospects are further dampened by the 2 million tons of refined copper that remain on the market, Chile's refusal to go along with production cuts, and Peru's decision to measure its 15-percent cut against capacity rather than against last year's production. Peru will be able to observe the letter of the agreement and still produce more than it did last year as new mines become productive.	25X1
	CHINA-JAPAN: Conflicting Claims	
25X1	Japan has officially protested the continuing presence of Chinese fishing vessels in Japanese-claimed waters around the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese have rejected the protest and reiterated their own claim to the Senkakus. At a press conference in Taipei, meanwhile, a Chinese Nationalist spokesman stated yesterday that Taiwan's claim to the islands was "indisputable."	
25X1	Japanese patrol vessels first sighted several Chinese ships fishing inside the islands' 12-mile limit on Wednesday. When asked to leave, the Chinese held up signs stating that the waters were Chinese. Tokyo clearly does not plan to use force; the Japanese have not boarded the Chinese ships or attempted to drive them off, but are maintaining surveillance.	

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25X1	In turning aside yesterday's Japanese protest, Chinese officials linked the incident to lack of progress on the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty. Japanese officials have said that they have no intention of connecting the two issues.
25X1	In 1972, when China and Japan restored diplomatic relations, both parties agreed to put aside their rival claims to the Senkakus for later negotiation. By sending 100 fishing vessels into the area32 of which have entered the 12-mile zonePeking is ignoring this agreement in an apparent effort to show
	its displeasure with Tokyo.
:	USSR - EAST EUROPE: Trade Deficits
25X1	Moscow continues to provide substantial assistance to its East European trade partners to cover their rapidly rising trade deficits with the USSR. These deficits—totaling \$1.9 billion last year, compared with \$157 million in 1974—have been incurred largely because of rising Soviet oil prices. Soviet help in sustaining deficits of this magnitude is particularly welcome to the East Europeans at this time because they are also faced with severe hard currency trade and payments problems.
25X1	The Soviets have extended ruble trade credits on terms that are not known to most of the East European countries and have also arranged some indirect hard currency relief. A multiyear agreement with Hungary, for example, provides for the exchange of Soviet "hard" goods—items easily marketable or in high demand—for Hungarian meat that had been shut out of the West European market.
25X1	Moscow has sometimes allowed East European countries to divert exports to the West to augment hard currency earnings. In other instances, the Soviets have provided unplanned deliveries of needed raw materials and semi-manufactures that otherwise would have to be imported from the West.
25X1	Higher oil prices have accounted for more than half the increase in the value of Soviet exports to the five East European countries running deficits with the USSR. Only Romania, which does not import Soviet oil but buys other raw materials
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from the USSR, enjoys a surplus in its trade with the Soviets, and even this has been dwindling. Moscow raised its oil prices 20 percent last year, and another 20-percent hike is scheduled for 1978, these increases will mean the East European will continue to have large deficits and a need for further Soviet financial support.

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Chile
The reorganization of the Chilean cabinet announced Tuesday night reflects President Pinochet's apparent determination to bring more civilians into the government. He may also be trying to counter charges that he is losing his grip in the face of pressing foreign and domestic problems. By naming a trusted civilian lawyer to the key post of Interior Minister and by giving him the authority to orchestrate further cabinet Pinochet seems to be upholding a commitment he made last week
to give civilians a broader role in the planned transition to civilian rule. The shift of a taciturn and austere Army general from the Interior to the Defense Ministry seems calculated to remove him from the initial process of completing a new constitution and organizing a plebiscite to approve it.
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